Held in Firstpost Homes Ltd v Johnson  that printed name is not enough. Formalities for creation and transfer - s. Requirements for deed found in s.
Try out our Premium Member services: Free for one month and pay only if you like it. This appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment of the defendant who is the appellant before us after service of notice to quit.
It appears that inthe plaintiff's' father brought a suit for ejectment against the appellant Pitambar and his brother Digambar from the disputed land and obtained a decree for Khas possession upon a solenama. InPitambar and his brother Digambar instituted a suit against the plaintiffs for specific performances of the contract, alleging that at the time of the solenama there was an agreement between the parties that the plaintiff would grant a lease of the lands to them.
The suit was decreed and the plaintiffs in the present case were given two months' time to execute a registered lease and make it over to the defendants and it was directed that in default thereof, the lands would be measured on the defendant's application for the purpose, and that a patta on the terms mentioned in the judgment would be prepared and executed by the Court on the defendant's depositing the necessary stamp and costs of registration.
In execution of the decree, the land was measured and the rent also was fixed, but the lease was not executed. It is stated that a patta was drawn up in favour of Pitambar alone, but it was not registered The defendant or his brother did not take any further steps in the matter and the execution case was struck off.
The plaintiffs served a notice under Section 49 of the Bengal Tenancy Act upon Pitambar alone and then brought this suit for ejectment.
The defence inter alia was that there was a tenancy in favour of both Pitambar and Digambar, that the notice to quit having been served upon Pitambar alone was not sufficient in law to determine the tenancy and that the plaintiffs' suit must therefore fail.
The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. On appeal that decree was reversed and the defendant has appealed to this Court. Now, Pitambar was the only tenant recognised by the plaintiffs. Although no patta has been executed in his favour nor any rent received from him, he was treated as a tenant in the notice to quit that was served upon him.
The notice to quit if he was the sole tenant was a good one and was properly served. That being only that of an under-raiyat, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for ejectment. The ground, however, upon which the right of the plaintiffs to eject is contested by the defendant is that there was a tenancy created not only in favour of Pitambar but also in favour of his brother Digambar, and that that tenancy could not be said to have been determined by a notice to quit served on Pitambar alone.
The plaintiffs alleged that after the decree for specific performance had been passed, Digambar left the village and was residing in a different place and that in fact he abandoned the land.
The Court of first instance was of opinion that there was no abandonment. The learned Subordinate Judge on appeal found "Digambar went to live elsewhere and consequently the plaintiffs' predecessor could only execute a patta in favour of the defendant.
But the execution case having been dismissed in the meantime, the patta was not delivered to the defendant. The learned Subordinate Judge has not clearly found that there was an abandonment by Digambar, and it is accordingly contended on behalf of the appellant that the fact that there was an agreement coupled with the fact that Pitambar and Digambar were in possession shows that there was a tenancy created and that on the principle of the case of Walsh v.
Lonsdale 21 Ch. The principle is that if there is an agreement to grant a lease and the intended lessee takes possession thereunder though the requisite legal document has not; been executed and registered, the parties are in the same position as if the document has been executed provided specific performance can be obtained between the parties to the agreement.
The principle has been followed in a large number of cases in this country, which aro noticed in the case of Shyamkishore Dey v. Umesh Chunder 35 C. In the present case, there is no doubt that there was an agreement to grant a lease and. It is contended that the fact that they were allowed to continue in possession was sufficient to show that there was part performance; and there are some decided cases in which the principle was applied when the lessee was in possession from before the agreement.
But where the possession commences before the agreement, but continues after the agreement has been entered into but with unequivocal reference to the agreement, such possession J might be considered as part performance. In the two cases, viz.
Krishna Gobinda Dutt 23 C. Umesh Ghunder 1 Ch.
Although at the time when the suit was brought, any suit for specific performance by the party in possession would have been barred, the learned Judges held that having lulled the party into security or partial security who might otherwise have at any time claimed specific performance: We think, however, that these principles cannot apply to the facts of the present case.
Here, a suit for specific performance was instituted. It was decreed and in execution some of the matters were settled. The principle upon which the case of Walsh v.
Lonsdale 23 C. As stated above an exception was made in cases where no definite period was fixed for performance of the agreement, or where the party had been lulled into security. But in the present case a suit for specific performance of the contract had already been brought and a decree obtained.Walsh v.
Lonsdale (), 21 Ch. D. 9. In L agreed in writing to lease a mill to W for 7 years, the rent to be paid in advance. W took possession and paid rent quarterly. In L demanded £, partly for rent already due and partly for rent in advance.
o Policy: AWM v Cth (); Invitations to Treat: Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Boots Chemists () Acceptance An acceptance is an unqualified assent to the terms of an offer which results in an actual consensus between the parties, or a. With reference to the decision in Walsh v Lonsdale () 21 CH D 9 discuss the differences between legal and equitable interests in land.
You should include specific examples in your answer. REFERENCES: Webb E. and Stephenson M., Focus Land Law, 4th ed., LexisNexis, Sydney, Lyster R. et al, Environmental and Planning Law in NSW, 3rd ed. Case: Walsh v. Lonsdale () 21 Ch.D. 9, where it was held that a specifically enforceable contract for a lease creates an equitable lease.
Equity is equality Where 2 or more parties have an interest in the same property, equity would seek to divide the property equally between the parties, unless there is good reason for any.
Readbag users suggest that ganb__pdf is worth reading. The file contains page(s) and is free to view, download or print. With reference to the decision in Walsh v Lonsdale () 21 CH D 9 discuss the differences between legal and equitable interests in land. You should include specific examples in your answer.
REFERENCES: Webb E. and Stephenson M., Focus Land Law, 4th ed., LexisNexis, Sydney,